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Introduction
The authors of the book reviewed here need no introducing. They are amongst the most-frequently cited scholars in the social sciences. They wrote many highly influential articles, as a rule together with Simon Jo-
hnson, and already published a book together in 2006. Their book needs 
no further praise; it opens with jacket quotes of praise by no fewer 
than five Nobel-prize winners in economics, and by amongst others 
Jared Dia- mond, Niall Ferguson, Francis Fukuyama, Joel Mokyr, Dani 
Rodrik and Ian Morris. It would not make much sense to add my humble 
eulogy to such distinguished recommendation. I will therefore mainly 
confine myself to critical comments. Not because one can only criti-
cize the book, although I am less impressed than the ‘reviewers’ I just 
referred to, but because amidst all that praise some critical counter-
poise from an economic histo- rian can do no harm.
Let me first briefly summarize its content. Acemoglu and Robinson set the stage 
in their Preface, discussing why Egyptians filled Tahrir Square. They think that is 
because those Egyptians were fed up with bad government and knew why their 
country is poor: “…because it has been ruled by a narrow elite that have organized 
society for their  own  benefit at the expense of the vast mass of the people.” (3) 
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That prompts our authors to suggest that you need broad political transformation 
for a poor society to become rich. The actual book then opens with a description of 
Nogales, Arizona, a small town in the United States, and Nogales, Sonora, a small 
town in Mexico. These towns have the same people, culture, and geog- raphy. 
Why is Nogales in the USA rich and its Mexican counterpart poor? The authors de-
vote their second chapter to theories that according to them cannot explain this 
and the third one to their theory that in their view does, stating the claim that prospe-
rity and poverty are determined by the incentives created by institutions. The next 
chapter deals with ‘the weight of history’, illustrating how institutions change throu-
gh political conflict and how the past shapes the present. The authors here em-
pha- size the importance of small differences and critical junctures and discuss the 
long-lasting different effects of the Black Death in Western and East- by, amongst 
others, analysing the rise and decline of the Soviet economy. Rise and decline basi-
cally also are the subjects of chapter six that focus- es on how Venice and the Roman 
Empire lost their economic dynamism. Chapter seven with  the telling title ‘The turning 
point. How a political revolution in 1688 changed institutions in England and led the 
way to the Industrial Revolution.’ deals with the Glorious Revolution in Britain. Like many 
institutionalist colleagues e.g. Douglass North, Acemoglu and Rob- inson claim that 
this revolution created an institutional set up in which ruling elites, in case they 
would have wanted to, could no longer system- atically  oppose development. The 
next  chapter deals with  elites  who continued to do so and asks why the politically 
powerful in many nations opposed industrialization. Chapters nine  and  ten  show 
how  European colonialism impoverished large parts of the world and how some parts 
of the world took different paths to prosperity from that of Britain.
In their explanations Acemoglu and Robinson attach a central importance to his-
torical junctures and path dependencies. Those path dependencies can lead to 
virtuous and vicious circles. These are the subjects of chap- ters eleven and twel-
ve that discuss how institutions that create prosper- ity generate what they call 
‘positive feedback’ loops and how institutions that create poverty generate what 
they  call ‘negative feedback’ loops. Chapter thirteen deals with  the  contemporary 
situation asking why nations fail today and answers that question by referring to 
bad institu- tions. The authors devote chapter fourteen to discussing how  a few 
1   See for example: Daron Acemoglu, Simon Johnson and James A. Robinson, ‘The colonial 
origins of comparative development: an empirical investigation’, American Economic 
Review, 91 (2001) 1369-1401; iidem, ‘The reversal of fortune: geography and institutions 
in the making of the  modern world  income distribution’, Quarterly Journal  of Economics, 
117 (2002) 1231- 1294; iidem, ‘The rise of Europe: Atlantic trade, institutional change and 
economic growth’, American Economic Review, 95, 3 (2005) 546-579, and iidem, ‘Institutions 
as a fundamental cause of long-run growth’, in P. Aghion and S. Durlauf, eds., Handbook 
of economic growth (Amsterdam /London 2005) Volume 1A, pages 385-472. Their previous 
book is called Economic origins of dictatorship and democracy (Cambridge 2006).
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countries changed their  economic trajectory by changing their  institu- tions. They 
refer to, amongst others, Botswana in the twentieth century, the Southern States of 
the USA after the Civil War and post-Mao China. In the  final  chapter they  summarize 
and  further explain  why  most attempts to combat poverty up until now have failed.
The message
This clearly is a book with a message. It starts from the thesis that poli- tics is at the 
basis of economic development and growth because politics determines what 
institutions a nation has. (See the title of chapter 3) It is about “the politics of po-
verty and progress.” (44. See also 69) Politics can only function adequately when 
there is a centralized state with  a monopoly of legitimate violence. Without such 
a monopoly and  the degree of centralization it entails, “the state cannot play its 
role of enforc- er of law and order, let alone provide public services and encourage 
and regulate economic activity.” (80) Whether a centralized state will develop 
economically depends on the nature of its institutions. In case they are inclusive 
it will, in case they are extractive it will not, at least not for long. The authors distin-
guish between economic institutions and (supportive) political  institutions. On  pages 
429-430, they  provide the  following descriptions. Inclusive economic institutions are 
institutions that “enforce property rights, create a level playing field, and encourage 
investments in new  technologies and skills.”  Inclusive political  institutions are ins-
titu- tions that “distribute political power widely in a pluralistic manner and are able to 
achieve some amount of political centralization so as to establish law and order, the 
foundation of secure property rights and an inclusive market economy.” Extractive 
economic institutions are  “structured to extract resources from the many by the few 
and … fail to protect prop- erty rights or provide incentives for economic activity.” 
Extractive politi- cal institutions “concentrate power in the hands of a few who will 
then have incentives to maintain and develop extractive economic institutions for 
their benefit.”
Sustained growth requires innovation, which involves risky changes for the es-
tablished elites, economically as well as politically. Those elites as a rule therefore 
object to innovation. Their behaviour in turn frequently creates political instability 
and struggles - often also inside the elites - for the spoils of rent seeking. Extractive 
institutions are about the slicing of pies, not their baking. They therefore have a ten-
dency to re-enforce them- selves in a vicious circle. The ‘right’ institutions instead 
tend to create virtuous circles. They provide an increasing number of citizens with 
incen- tives and possibilities to use them and guarantee them they can enjoy the 
results of their  efforts. In that way  a society taps its potential with increasing effi-
ciency. Societies with  extractive political institutions can have economic growth, 
2  See further for several other always slightly varying descriptions in the Index under ‘extractive 
institutions’ and under ‘inclusive institutions’.
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for example, by reallocating inputs to sectors with higher productivity, increasing 
inputs and putting severe pressure on the labour force, or allowing some niches for 
inclusive institutions. Sev- eral Caribbean islands, notorious for their slave labour 
and plantations, were amongst the richest places in the world in the last decades 
of the eighteenth century. The Soviet Union did grow, and now, for example, does 
China. But in the Caribbean and the Soviet Union growth stopped and according to 
our authors it will stop in China. In absence of struc- tural  innovations and  room  for 
initiative and  participation decreasing returns in time are unavoidable.
If inclusive institutions are essential for growth, the question raises itself whether 
and how one can build them. Acemoglu and Robinson point out that ‘…there is no 
recipe for building such (i.e. inclusive PV) institutions” (460) and that “You can’t en-
gineer prosperity.” (446) You can introduce certain institutions but it is not easy to 
make them actually work and they
will usually not work unless something is done about the root causes of previous 
malfunctioning. Much  depends on historical contingency, the coming together of 
specific factors in a specific critical juncture as the authors illustrate in their story 
about the Black Death that triggered a process of peasant liberation in Western 
Europe whereas in Central and Eastern Europe  it triggered the so-called Second 
Serfdom. Small initial differences here led to completely different outcomes and 
path-dependen- cies. It is not easy to escape from history and path-dependency 
but, so they emphasize, the past is not destiny. (chapter 14)
Some general comments
The title of the book is not very fortunate. It is not about nations that fail. The  expres-
sion ‘failing  nations’ conjures up  associations with  ‘failed states’, that is states lac-
king  sovereign government that centralizes power and  rule.  Actually, however, 
many  if not  most of the  ‘failing’ states our authors refer to, in that respect function 
quite well: their rulers often are (more than) powerful enough and wilfully keep their 
subjects in the situation they are in as our authors themselves repeatedly emphasi-
ze (See e.g. 3, 66, 68, 83). The suggestion in the title that the book would be about 
‘the origins of power’ also is somewhat misleading. The book asks why countries 
are rich or poor, and claims that power-relations are fundamental in answering that 
question. It ranges from  the  Neolithic Revolution to the  contemporary world  and 
for example discusses the Roman  and the Mayan Empires, the histories of Venice, 
Spanish Latin America, early modern Britain, the United States and the Soviet Union, 
but also contemporary China and Botswana. The authors time and again exemplify, 
illustrate and ‘prove’ their theses via case studies and vignettes from all over the 
3   Actually the authors focus on the functioning of states and the policies of 
their governments not on nations.
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globe and from all periods of history. That unfortunately makes the text, that as such 
is very well written, very repetitive. Its sys- tem of referencing makes it hard if not 
downright impossible to trace the sources for specific information. The reader 
sorely  misses graphs and tables.
Nothing is easier, and less fair, when confronted with such an encom- passing and 
erudite text, than to point at omissions in the bibliography. One can never satisfy 
all specialists. But I nevertheless before beginning my actual review want to 
point  at some omissions because they  are really consequential. When it comes 
to the history of the Ottoman and Mughal  Empires, and of Ming and Qing China,  the 
authors have over-looked - or chosen not to take on board– fundamental revisions 
in schol- arship. There, for example, is no reference at all to the major revisions su-
ggested by scholars like Kenneth Pomeranz, Roy Bin Wong or Andre Gunder Frank 
with regard to the history of China in the early modern era. The amount of literature 
on which the comments on China are based overall is very small. Their image of Latin 
America’s history also is very traditional. Here too new insights are not discussed. 
As proclaimed ‘insti- tutionalists’, Acemoglu and Robinson surprisingly enough all 
but com- pletely ignore work by other institutionalists. The most striking example is 
Violence and social orders by Douglass North, Joseph Wallis and Barry Weingast, 
a book from 2009 dealing with a quite similar topic. It is in their  list of references but 
never discussed.The  extensive literature about the role of the state in economic 
development that defends other positions than the authors is not confronted.
Levels of analysis: what about proximate causes?
The question at hand in the book can be tackled at differing levels. Its authors only 
discuss ‘ultimate causes’ while ignoring ‘proximate causes’. The factors of produc-
tion, i.e. land, labour and capital, their specific allo- cation, and technology, the direct 
originators of growth, are never dis- cussed as variables in their own right. They play 
no role in the book. Only geography, culture, knowledge of which policies will enrich 
a country and institutions are considered as possible explanations for levels of 
wealth. The authors ‘conclude’ that institutions are decisive. Even though they 
never actually say so their book reads as if with  the right institutions development 
and growth are assured. Can one really push the claim that institutions ‘rule’ that far?
4   Douglass C. North, John Joseph Wallis, and Barry R. Weingast, Violence 
and social orders. A conceptual framework for interpreting recorded human 
history (Cambridge 2009).
5  Colin White, Understanding global economic development. A global 
transition from poverty to prosperity? (Cheltenham and Northampton 2009) 
under ‘Causation’, ‘proximate’ and ‘ulti- mate’.
6   See for this expression Dani Rodrik, Arvind Subramanian, Francesco Trebbi, 
‘Institutions rule: the primacy of institutions over geography and integration in 
economic development’, Journal of Economic Growth 9, 2 (2004) 131–165.
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Let us begin with proximate causes. The relevance of my previous com- ment 
becomes apparent when we compare Why nations fail with Jeffrey Williamson’s, 
Trade and poverty. When the Third World fell behind, that came out  about a year 
ago. It too  is about the  (origins  of the)  gap between rich and poor countries. His 
approach, though, is completely different and he focuses on an entirely different 
set of factors. His expla- nation of why  the Third World fell behind after industriali-
sation in the West had taken off, roughly dealing with the period from the end of the 
eighteenth century to the Second World War, is squarely in the tradition of classical 
economics and built around the general theorem of comparative advantage and its 
elaboration in the Heckscher-Ohlin model for international trade. Industrialization in 
Western countries from the beginning of the nineteenth century onwards, with all its 
accompanying effects (in particular increasing population and, in time, increasing 
purchasing pow- er), coupled with cheaper transport and lower tariffs, led to a glo-
bal trade boom. A worldwide division of labour emerged with countries specializing 
according to their comparative advantage. All countries involved profited from it, 
some, however, the industrializing ones, much more  than the non-industrializing 
ones. When  it comes to the  non-Western countries that had not (yet) begun to 
industrialize he distinguishes between coun- tries where labour was relatively abun-
dant and resources relatively scarce and countries where the situation was the 
other way around. For those countries where resources were scarce and labour 
abundant, like Japan and China, it ceteris paribus was logical to try a labour-intensi-
ve industri- alization, which worked out in Japan but for specific reasons did not in 
China.  For countries lacking  a developed industrial sector but  rich in natural resour-
ces it was only logical to focus on exporting primary prod- ucts to the industrializing 
countries, especially since at least till the 1870s their  terms of trade improved. 
Just as it was only ‘logical’ that they would  undergo severe de-industrialization as 
new  investments became concentrated in the profitable export sectors and the 
existing manufactur- ing sector was wiped out by Western industry. Those who 
owned the natural resources collected high rents and felt no necessity to invest 
in industry. And just as important: it would have been very hard to do so profitably.
Even though specializing according to comparative advantage was the logical 
thing to do, the consequent de-industrialization only threw further obstacles in the 
way of any effort to catch up with countries that already were industrialising. Such 
countries tended to have higher growth rates than non-industrializing ones. In-
dustry and modern services, especially as urban activities, overall have higher 
7  Jeffrey G. Williamson, Trade and poverty. When the Third World fell behind 
(Cambridge Mass. and London 2011).
8   Apart from his emphasis on the fact that certain economic activities 
in certain conditions – he refers in particular to industrial activities and 
modern services in urban settings – have increas- ing returns.
9   See for this model http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Heckscher–Ohlin_model
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returns to scale than traditional sec- tors and as a rule increasing rather than de-
creasing returns. Industry was the carrier of substantial growth: countries without 
it found it harder to develop and  increasingly fell behind. In the  period  1870-
1940, when overall the terms of trade for primary products no longer ‘improved’ 
as compared to those of industrial products but on the other hand the wage gap 
between core and periphery had further widened, the conditions for industrialization 
in the resource-rich periphery in principle became more favourable. We indeed see 
some examples of industrial ‘lift-off’. But now the  extreme volatility  of the  prices of 
primary  products made many peripheral economies very vulnerable and the gap 
between rich and poor overall  grew rather than diminished. Resource-scarce 
and labour-abun- dant Japan experienced its take-off in this period. For various 
specific reasons China did not.
Williamson’s argumentation of course is more complex than my ultra-brief synthe-
sis. But my aim is not to discuss its complexity or validity but to show how he sets 
out to explain the gap between rich and poor - and to my view largely manages to do 
so - almost entirely in terms of proximate causes. He is wary of exaggerating the 
importance of institutions. Let me give two quotes: “…the choice of which commo-
dity to produce and export was not a choice at all, but rather was an outcome 
determined by geography, factor endowments and international demand not insti-
tutional quality.” He regards price-volatility as a major problem for countries exporting 
primary products. That makes the following comment all the more telling: “But within 
the periphery we see virtually no systematic relationship between institutional quality 
and subsequent volatility.” Maybe Williamson has a tendency to turn endowment 
and comparative advantage into fate. There are several examples of countries that 
caught up notwithstanding their ‘unfavourable’ factor endowments and com- pa-
rative advantages - for example Canada and the USA, that both could have been 
‘cursed’ by their resources - and in those cases institutions and politics played a 
crucial role. But he raises a question that is fundamental for my review of Why na-
tions fail: Would the  countries of what was becoming the Third World have been 
much better of with the ‘right’ institutions or is their predicament (also) a matter basic 
economic mecha- nisms? Acemoglu and Robinson do not ask that question. As I 
said, they never discuss proximate causes. Nor do they problematize whether 
con- sidering their geography, factor endowments and international demand later 
Third World countries ever had any realistic chance to build good institutions and 
what that would  mean for their thesis of institutional primacy.
10  See e.g. Williamson, Trade and poverty, 213-214.
11  Williamson, Trade and poverty, 190.
12  Williamson, Trade and poverty, 191.
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Rejected ultimate causes
Acemoglu and Robinson do consider other possible ultimate causes than institu-
tions but reject them. They, to my view correctly, are sceptical about geographical 
approaches à la Jared Diamond and more recently Ian Morris, who nevertheless 
both praise their book. They are, however, somewhat rash in denying geography 
any major role in explaining the wealth and especially the poverty of nations, apart 
from facilitating or eliciting the emergence of certain extractive institutions. For di-
fferent views I can only refer to publications by Jeffrey Sachs, Paul Krugman, Clint 
Ballinger and obviously Diamond and Morris. In their denial of any major importance to 
culture for economic development the authors also are rather outspoken. Several 
renowned ‘institutionalist’ colleagues would not agree. I only refer to Avner Greif and 
Douglass North. Schol-ars like Joel Mokyr and Deirdre McCloskey are convinced ‘cul-
ture’ played a major role in the emergence of modern economic growth in the West. 
David Landes is famous, or notorious, for his claim, that in economic development 
“… culture makes all the difference”.Even Eric Jones, who is not fond of cultural 
explanations, admits that: “… culture, in the form of preferences and  behavioural 
routines can  hold implications for the economy” and “may act as a brake or filter.” All 
these scholars of course can be wrong, but their arguments had deserved more 
attention than the seven pages that Acemoglu and Robinson devote to the rejec-
tion of the “culture hypothesis”. Their rejection of what they  call “the  ignorance 
hypothesis” is less problematic. Ignorance of their rulers indeed is not the reason 
that poor countries are poor. It rather is lack of concern. If the corollary of their 
13  See their praise for it on page II and the back-flap of the book. In a more 
extensive review, however, Diamond has criticized the book. See http://
www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2012/jun/07/what-makes-countries-
rich-or-poor. Acemoglu and Robinson do not refer to Morris but to my view 
quite effectively refute Diamond’s claims as far as they would be extended 
to “modern world inequality.” (48-56) For Morris’ approach, see his Why 
the West rules - for now. The patterns of history, and what they reveal 
about the future (London 2010) and my review in Journal of Global History 7, 
1 (2012) 143-147.
14 For the work of Sachs and Krugman I refer to their websites. For an important 
article by Ballinger see  Clint Ballinger, Why geographic factors are necessary 
in development studies http://philosophyofscience.webstarts.com/
working_papers.html 
15  See e.g. Avner Greif, Institutions and the path to the modern economy: 
Lessons from medieval trade (Cambridge 2006) passim, quite explicit on pages 
39 and 45; Douglass C. North, Understanding the process of economic change 
(Princeton and Oxford 2005) VIII, and chapters 3 and 4, and North, Wallis and 
Weingast, Violence and social orders, 27-29.
16  Deirdre McCloskey, Bourgeois dignity. Why economics can’t explain the 
modern world (Chi- cago and London 2010) chapters 1 to 3, and Joel Mokyr, 
The enlightened economy. An eco- nomic history of Britain 1700-1850 
(New Haven and London 2009) chapters 1 to 5.
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view  would  be that it is common knowledge what causes economies to grow, 
that would be a quite surprising assumption. It clearly is not. Economists fiercely 
and fundamentally disagree amongst each other on the causes of the wealth and 
poverty of nations.
Vagueness and rosy views: the example of Britain
Whether nations ‘fail’, or not, depends on whether their  political  and economic 
institutions are inclusive or extractive. That is the main and as such quite plausibly 
sounding message of the authors. Considering their fundamental role in the au-
thors’ thesis, it is striking how vaguely these terms are  defined and  how  little ope-
rationalization is provided. The authors never refer to any concrete, measurable 
indicators for the pres- ence of the type of institutions they refer to. Let us to figure out 
what they apparently have in mind and what that means for their thesis, look at 
their most prominent case study and the example they discuss most extensively: 
Britain after the Glorious Revolution. This clearly is their fin- est case. According to the 
authors “Prior to seventeenth-century Eng- land, extractive institutions were the 
norm  throughout history.” (184) That apparently changed with the Glorious Revolu-
tion that is described as ‘the turning point’ (the title of chapter 7) and as crucial in the 
global history of development. Acemoglu and Robinson postulate a direct con- 
nection between it and the Industrial Revolution. (197. See also the title of chapter 
7) One might expect the authors to then be very concrete in indicating what exact 
institutional changes during  this critical juncture increased Britain’s prosperity and 
enhanced its chances to industrialize. They are not. Several of the more concre-
te claims they do make, are dubious. Did the Glorious Revolution and its outcome 
actually mean, that “Parliament itself controlled spending”? (192) Did the Bank of 
England really function as “a source of funds for industry”? (195) Is it true that the 
Glorious Revolution “undermined state sanctioned monopolies”? (208) Unsur-
prisingly, as institutionalists they repeatedly assert that the Revolution led to an 
improvement in the security and efficiency of prop- erty  rights. (197) The sugges-
tion that before the  Glorious  Revolution property had always been insecure and 
badly defined is very farfetched. I can only quote Deirdre McCloskey: “Numerous 
societies - in fact all of them, or else they are not societies but wars of all against all 
- have produced rules of property. Julian Hoppit even claims, that in many respects 
property rights were less well protected after the Glorious Revolution!
17   David Landes, The wealth and poverty of nations. Why some are so rich and 
some so poor (New York 1998) 516.
18 E.L. Jones, Cultures merging. A historical and economic critique of culture 
(Princeton and Oxford 2006) 259 and 270.
19   McCloskey, Bourgeois dignity, 316.
20  See his ‘Compulsion, compensation and property rights in Britain, 1660-
1833’, Past and Present number 210 (2011) 93-128.
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Not many economic historians, moreover, are convinced of the existence in Britain 
of tight connections between institutional change and industri- alization. Robert 
Allen, Gregory Clark, Nick Crafts, Ronald Findlay and Kevin O’Rourke clearly are not. I 
would side with them. There are many examples in history where protecting exis-
ting property rights actually had negative effects for economic development. 
Acemoglu and Robinson never discuss that real possibility. When it comes to inte-
llectual property rights, their positive impact on economic development is not as 
obvious as they suggest.
Let us turn to the way in which they operationalize their central con- cepts for the British 
case. At the time of its Glorious Revolution Britain was a centralized state. It quickly 
became the best-organised and most efficient state in the world in terms of mobi-
lizing money, resources and people. When it comes to the question how inclusive 
and pluralist Brit-ain actually was after the Glorious Revolution it is hard, whatever 
pre- cise definition one would want to start from, not to think that Acemo-glu and Robin-
son are ‘over-optimistic’. They themselves mention that in eighteenth-century Britain 
only two per cent of the population had the vote (192), but nevertheless write that the 
Glorious Revolution “opened up the political system to a broad cross section of the 
population” (102) and was “the  foundation for creating a pluralistic society.” (102) 
On page 192, it even reads that “The English people (sic! PV) now  had access to 
Parliament.” I would not consider the fact that ordinary people could write petitions to 
influence Parliament a compensation for the lack of a real vote. (192-194) Their plura-
list interpretation of the Glorious Revolution as carried by a broad coalition of “Atlantic 
traders, industrial- ists, commercially minded gentry” also is rather ‘optimist’. (410) 
The so-called moneyed interests amongst the Whigs always were a small minority in 
Parliament. Wealthy landowners continued to be by far the biggest group there over 
the entire eighteenth century. The importance our authors attach to Atlantic trade 
at the time of the Glorious Revolution is exaggerated. The really important thing about 
the political development in Britain is not the emergence of broad and pluralistic institu- 
tions but the fact that Britain over time became a society with the rule of law. The authors 
21   See Robert C. Allen, Global economic history. A very short introduction (Oxford 
2011) 16 and 29; Gregory Clark, A farewell to alms. A brief economic 
history of the world (Princeton and Oxford 2007) 10: “…institutions play 
at best a minor direct role in the story of the Industrial Revolution … The 
institutions necessary for growth existed long before growth itself began.” 
Nick Crafts wrote: “…there was no obvious improvement in institutions 
at the  time of the Industrial Revolution.” I found this quote in McCloskey, 
Bourgeois dignity, 343. She refers to a manuscript by Crafts that I could not 
actually consult myself. Finally there are the comments by Ronald Findlay 
and Kevin H. O’Rourke, Power and plenty. Trade, war, and the world econo- my 
in the second millennium (Princeton and Oxford 2007) 349.
22  See Joel Mokyr, ‘Intellectual property rights, the industrial revolution and the 
beginnings of modern economic growth’,  http://acadia.law.northwestern.
edu/searlecenter/papers/Mokyr_ industrial.pdf
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23   See for example John Brewer, The sinews of power. War, money and the 
English state, 1688-1783 (London 1988); Michael Mann, The sources of social 
power. Volume II. The rise of classes and nation states, 1760-1914 (Cambridge 
1993) and the many publications on the Brit- ish state by Patrick O’Brien. See his 
website at the London School of Economics.
24  See in the Index under ‘Glorious Revolution’, and inclusive institutions, and ‘Glorious Revo-
lution’, and pluralism.
25  See Phyllis Deane and W.A. Cole, British economic growth 1688-1959. 
Trends and structure (second edition: Cambridge 1967. Originally 1962) 87. 
In Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson,‘The rise of Europe’, it reads on page 546: 
“In fact between 1500 and 1800, Western Europe experienced a historically 
unprecedented period of sustained growth…” This ‘fact’ is then con- nected to 
‘Atlantic trade’. Not many economic historians would endorse these claims.
26   See for brief descriptions of these terms North, Wallis and Weingast, 
Violence and social orders, 114, chapter 5 under ‘Content’ and further in the 
Index.
27   See note 32.
28   See under http://gpih.ucdavis.edu/Distribution.htm. I consulted the site on 
15-4-2012. For extreme inequality in terms of wealth I only refer to landed 
property. In many ‘extractive’ coun- tries at the time that was more equally 
distributed than in post-Glorious Revolution Britain.
29  See for example M.J. Daunton, Trusting Leviathan: the politics of taxation 
in Britain, 1799-1914 (Cambridge 2001); Philip Harling and Peter Mandler, ‘From 
“fiscal-military” state to lais- sez-faire state, 1760-1850’, Journal  of British Studies 
32, 1 (1993) 44-70, and Robert M. Kozub, ‘Evolution of taxation in England, 1700-
1850: a period of war and industrialization’, The Journal of European Economic 
History 32, 2 (2003) 363-387.
are fully aware of that fact but do not analyse it in depth. (See chapter 11) Here they 
could have learned from North, Wallis and  Weingast who  in their  Violence and social 
orders  focus on how exactly an ‘open  access society’ could emerge and under what 
‘door- step-conditions’.
Economic inclusiveness can indeed, as the authors suggest, be related to the 
(non-)existence of monopolies. In Britain over the entire eighteenth century their 
importance decreased but they certainly did not disappear. Just think of the East In-
dia Company or the Hudson Bay Company. Many regulations and much ‘exclusion’ 
persisted. Inclusion in economic terms to my view would also mean the existence of 
a certain equality of income and wealth. In that respect it is striking and not exactly 
in accordance with the impression Acemoglu and Robinson give, that the distribu-
tion of incomes and wealth was extremely unequal in Britain, more unequal than in 
many  countries with  the  ‘wrong’ institutions. Britain’s  tax  system after the Glorious 
Revolution also does not strike me as particularly inclu- sive. Parliament decided on 
taxation: the bulk of tax income came from excises and customs and hit the ordinary 
people without the vote harder than the wealthy voters. Taxes became the highest 
in Europe and were regressive. Taxes on land were low and income tax did not exist 
until the 1840s, except for the war-period of 1799 to 1816. A substantial amount 
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of tax  income - some thirty  to forty  per cent of government expenditure during the 
eighteenth century and more than fifty per cent after the Napoleonic Wars - was 
used to pay debt charges and pocketed by a wealthy minority of Britons who had 
lent money to the government.
Real wages for skilled and unskilled labour in Britain were (amongst) the highest 
in the world in the eighteenth century but I would not describe labour  conditions as 
inclusive. British labour  was subjected to a harsh regime of discipline and it did 
not have many rights. This certainly also applies to the army and navy, where thou-
sands of people were simply pressed to serve and support their country all over the 
globe. What does this all mean for Britain’s assumed pluralism and inclusiveness? 
Do these few comments not already suffice to show that one cannot deal with the 
topics the  book discusses without clear  definitions and indicators and without 
systematic comparisons? I will return briefly to those compari- sons later on.
The reference to what happened outside the borders of Britain brings us to an even 
more problematic side of Britain’s supposedly inclusive institu- tions: what about 
the exclusion inherent to British mercantilism, and what about the British Empire? 
Acemoglu and Robinson are surprisingly laconic about Britain’s often extremely ex-
clusive behaviour ‘abroad’. This is their comment on the effects of the Navigation 
Acts: “This advantage for Eng- lish traders and manufacturers naturally increased 
their profits and may have further encouraged innovation in these new and highly 
innovative activities.” (202) They know quite well that the aim of those acts was 
“to facilitate England’s monopolization of international trade” (202) and see no 
problem in referring to “aggressive protection of traders and manufacturers” as 
one of the factors leading to Britain’s industrialization. (202) Trade, power and war 
were closely related; not just for Britain but for many countries in the world. I guess 
I do not have to explain how excluded non-British inhabitants of the  British Empire 
were. Britain at least up until the 1820s, was a fiscal-military and ‘imperialist’ state 
with a government that in several respects still was economically intervention- ist 
30  James Macdonald, A free nation deep in debt. The financial roots of 
democracy (Princeton and Oxford 2006) passim.
31   Findlay and O’Rourke, Power and plenty.
32  The amount of literature is huge. For information on Britain’s fiscal-military state I refer to 
note 22. For British mercantilism and the role of the state in Britain’s economy I refer to 
chapters 7 and 8 of Roderick Floud and Paul Johnson, eds., The Cambridge Economic 
History of Modern Britain. Volume I, Industrialisation, 1700-1860 (Cambridge 2004); David 
Ormrod, The rise of commercial empires. England and the Netherlands in the age of 
mercantilism, 1650-1770 (Cam- bridge 2003) and William Ashworth, Customs and excise. 
Trade, production and consumption in England, 1640-1845 (Oxford 2003). For a recent 
debate on British mercantilism see The William and Mary Quarterly 69, 1 (2012) 3-70. For 
‘regulation’ see Perry Gauci, ed., Regulating the British economy, 1660-1850 (Farnham UK 
and Burlington USA 2011).
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and pro-active, not a state that just provided incentives for a large number of its 
subjects.
Discussing countries in isolation and superficially comparing them
As a global historian, I am interested in connections and comparisons. In that 
respect Why nations fail is disappointing, especially considering the excellent - 
in particular comparative - work of its authors in the past. The scant attention for 
international political economy in Why nations fail is quite problematic. You do not 
have to swallow world-systems theory or dependency theory, to admit that the 
existence of ‘wrong institutions’ in many parts of the world – even long after official 
colonialism had ended - was not (exclusively) a domestic problem but one of global 
political economy in which states with inclusive institutions at home often sup- 
ported extractive institutions abroad. The implications of this  fact  are never ex-
plicitly discussed. The authors e.g. simply refer to the bad institu- tions of Guatemala 
in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries without any reference to the interference 
by the United States in the internal affaires of that country (345-351) Admittedly, 
international dimensions are prom- inent in their book when it comes to the colonial 
origins of poverty but then seriously neglected when it comes to developments in 
independent countries after de-colonization or in countries that even though they 
for- mally had always been independent never had real sovereignty. As it is, the  im-
portance of formal  independence as well as formal  dependence tends to be exa-
ggerated. In the case of formal colonialism that clearly shows in this quote: “If the 
political and economic institutions of Latin America over the past five hundred years 
were shaped by Spanish colo- nialism, those of the Middle East were shaped by 
Ottoman colonialism.” (120) Even if we would not nit-pick about countries like Brazil 
or Iran, this is an oversimplification, as if colonized regions had no agency whatso- 
ever themselves and as if there were no other interfering actors or rele-vant factors 
apart from the colonizers.
Whether a country’s institutions are inclusive or not, in the end is a mat- ter of de-
gree and  of comparison. When  I confine myself to the  early modern era and to 
economic extraction (the field of my expertise), I must say the comparisons in the 
book are rather superficial and tend to be biased in favour of the West. Africa gets 
rather short thrift:
“Africa was the part of the world with the institutions least able to  take  advan-
tage of the  opportunities made available by the Industrial Revolution. For 
33  For the importance of agency of the colonised, in this case in Africa, see 
e.g. Gareth Austin, ‘The ‘reversal of fortune’ thesis and the compression of 
history: perspectives from African and comparative economic history’, Journal of 
International Development 20 (2008) 996-1027.
34  See for some data my ‘Governing growth: a comparative analysis of the role 
of the state in the rise of the West’, Journal of World History 13, 1 (2002) 67-138.
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at least the  last  one  thousand years, outside of small pockets and during 
limited periods of time, Africa has lagged behind the rest of the world in terms 
of technology, political development and prosperity.” (115)
It would have been interesting to read more about why this has been the case. When 
it comes to the Ottoman Empire, one finds the standard ‘cli- chés’ that it would have 
been highly extractive, ‘conservative’ and ‘abso-lutist’. (See the Index) No reference 
is made to publications by Timur Kuran, a scholar who tries to find out why develop-
ment in the Middle East stagnated and focuses on institutional factors, in particular 
law. India, early modern as well as modern, is hardly mentioned at all. Here too recent 
literature presenting new perspectives is not used. Imperial China is systematica-
lly described in terms of oriental despotism: com- ments are almost all about its 
‘absolutism’ and extractive institutions. Its regime is characterised as suspicious 
of change and contacts with other societies. The authors claim that under the Ming 
and Qing dynasties the control of the state on economic activity tightened and 
overseas trade was banned and  suggest that the  state monopolised over-
seas trade. (231-234) Government supposedly killed all initiatives. That is hard to 
believe considering its weakness that in the  nineteenth century often became 
so serious that it was unable to rule large parts of the country. The authors here 
really should have caught up with the literature. Most experts in the field now agree 
that taxation was lower in China than in Britain and that China’s domestic economy 
was as free as that of Britain and knew less inequality of income and wealth. Pro-
perty rights in China in all probability were better protected than has often been 
asserted.  Of course, each of these claims can be challenged, but it certainly is far 
less clear that Hanoverian Britain had the ‘right’ institutions and Qing China the ‘wrong’ 
ones than Acemoglu and Robinson claim. 
35  For the actually quite low level of extraction see Sevket Pamuk, ‘Ottoman 
state finances in comparative European perspective, 1500-1914’, The 
Journal of Economic History 70 (2010) 593-627 (with Kivanç Karaman).
36   See e.g. Timur Kuran, The long divergence. How Islamic law held back the 
Middle East (Princeton and Oxford 2011).
37  See, e.g., for the early modern period Prasannan Parthasarathi, Why 
Europe grew rich and Asia did not (Cambridge 2011).
38  For example Timothy Brook, The troubled empire: China in the Yuan and Ming 
Dynasties (Cambridge Mass. and London 2010) and William Rowe, China’s 
last empire. The great Qing (Cambridge Mass. and London 2009).
39  See my Public finance in China and Britain in the long eighteenth century, 
http://www2.lse. ac.uk/economicHistory/workingPapers/2012/WP167.
pdf and Kent Deng, China’s political economy in modern times. Changes 
and economic consequences, 1800-2000 (London and New York 2011) 
chapters 2 and 3. For information concerning inequality see notes 28, 40 
and 49.
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Latin America seems like the ideal case for them to prove their thesis. They present 
it as the perfect institutional counterpoint of Canada and the USA. (If for the sake 
of convenience we leave aside its Southern States) Their image of it fits perfectly in 
the tradition of the Black Legend. That legend, however, is now  challenged. Je-
ffrey Williamson, for example, qualifies the thesis that Latin America would always 
have been charac- terised by extreme inequality of income and wealth. Income 
inequality as measured by the Gini-coefficient, till the 1870s, was not higher than in 
pre-industrial Northwest Europe  but  rather lower, although Williamson thinks that 
its extraction rate  (how much of the available surplus was actually extracted by the 
elite) was higher. He assumes that ordinary incomes in Latin America were quite 
low. In a couple of recent studies, that view is no longer endorsed. Let me quote 
two of them:
“We  show that nominal  wages and  prices (in Spanish Latin America, PV) 
were on  average much higher  than in Western Europe or in Asia … Labour 
scarcity … resulted in real wages much above subsistence and in some 
cases (Mexico, Bolivia, Argentina) comparable to levels in North-western 
Europe. … Perhaps due to a different pattern of depopulation, the real wa-
ges of other regions (Peru, Colombia and Chile) were much lower, and only 
increased above subsistence during the first half of the 18th century.”
This is from the abstract of another revisionist article:
“… living standards of the Spanish Americans compare favourably with tho-
se of other regions of the world, including Europe. … Our findings suggest 
that the  Great  Divergence in living standards between Spanish America 
and the developed Western countries might have taken place mainly after 
the Independence.”
If these revisionist claims are correct and the economies of colonial Span- ish Latin 
America were not (substantially) more unequal and poorer than other economies 
40  Jeffrey G. Williamson, ‘Five centuries of Latin American income inequality’, 
Revista de His- toria Económica /Journal of Iberian and Latin American 
Economic History 28, 2 (2010) 227-252.
41  Leticia Arroyo Abad, Elwyn Davies, and Jan Luiten van Zanden, ‘Between 
conquest and independence: Real wages and demographic change in 
Spanish Latin America, 1530-1820’, Explorations in Economic History 49, 
2 (2012) 149-166.
42  Rafael Dobado-Gonzáles and Héctor García-Montero, ‘Neither so low nor so 
short: Wages and heights in Bourbon Spanish America from an international 
comparative perspective’, EHES Working papers in economic history 
number 14, 2012. http://ehes.org/EHES_No14.pdf, con- sulted 15-5-
2012. For quite similar views see their ‘Colonial origins of inequality in Hispanic 
America? Some reflections based on new empirical evidence’, Revista de 
Historia Económica 28, 02 (2010) 253-277.
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in the  America’s or Western Europe, that has  major consequences for Acemoglu’s 
and Robinson’s thesis that different colo-nial regimes and their institutional legacies 
were at the root of different economic development. When  it came to  those bad 
institutions that according to  many  scholars,  including Acemoglu and  Robinson, 
had caused the (assumed) poverty and inequality in (Spanish) Latin America re-
ference was mostly made to coerced labour and the drain of resources to Spain. 
Several authors now claim that the emphasis on coerced labour and domestic 
extractive institutions has been unjustified as their impor-tance became quite small 
over time. Regina Grafe and Alejandra Irigoin focus on the drain to Spain and want to 
revise “the traditional view of Spain as a predatory colonial state that extracted 
revenue from natural resources and populations in the Americas while offering little 
in return.” In their view “much of colonial revenue was immediately fed back into the 
local economy, while minimizing enforcements costs.” Again, one need not necessa-
rily believe all the revisionists. But one cannot simply ignore them either.
How tight is the relationship between prosperity and inclusive institutions?
Acemoglu and Robinson claim that centralized states with inclusive insti- tutions 
are richer than those with non-inclusive ones. They assume that the  causality 
is from  inclusiveness to wealth and  not  the  other way around. Even if we would 
accept the general gist of their thesis, which I do, there - apart from the comments 
already made - are several reasons to in any case qualify it. I will do so by simply 
asking questions that I consider pertinent. What, for example, about Mancur 
Olson’s thesis on institutional sclerosis, that suggests, that societies with greater 
numbers of interest groups grow slower, accumulate less capital, and experience 
reduced productivity growth relative to others. What about Robert Bar-ro’s the-
sis on economic growth and democracy, that claims: “There is a suggestion of 
a nonlinear relationship in which more democracy enhances growth at low levels 
of political freedom but depresses growth when a moderate level has already 
been attained.” The number of people who have something to lose by innovation 
43   See e.g. Dobado-Gonzáles and García-Montero, ‘Neither so low nor so short, 
1-4.
44  The quote is from the abstract of Regina Grafe and Alejandra Irigoin, ‘A 
stakeholder empire: the  political  economy of Spanish imperial rule in 
America’, Economic History  Review 65, 2 (2012) 609-651. In this respect 
it is interesting to compare several colonial drains as Williamson does in his 
Trade and poverty, 163-165. The drain from Spanish Latin America to Spain 
rela- tively speaking indeed was fairly small.
45   See for that thesis e.g. his The rise and decline of nations.
46  Robert J. Barrow, ‘Democracy and growth’, Journal of Economic Growth 
1 (1996) 1-27. Abstract. I do not want to suggest the debate has been 
settled. See e.g. Dani Rodrik, The glo- balization paradox. Why global 
markets, states, and democracy can’t  coexist (Oxford 2011) chapter 11, 
note 3, pages 311-312.
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or globalization and oppose them in current democratic welfare states is huge. 
Most of them are not members of the elite, which often is in favour of innovation and 
globalization. What about negative effects of at least some sorts and amounts 
of (ethnic) pluralism?
According to Acemoglu and Robinson, extractive institutions will not be able to sustain growth 
in the long run. Claims about the long run always are problematic. Olson and Barrow as a 
rule refer to highly developed societies and so did I in referring to welfare states, 
but what about societies that have not yet taken-off? Acemoglu and Robinson 
focus on the role of elites in obstruct- ing fundamental innovation and that role 
often indeed has been decisive. But my guess would be that industrialization as 
it occurred in countries that are industrialized now, would have been rejected in 
many of them if it had been made subject of a broad democratic referendum. It is 
no acci- dent that countries during their take-off almost without exception were 
quite  authoritarian and  often even became increasingly authoritarian. They in any 
case were not exactly democratic. In most developed economies industrialization 
came from above. There are also good reasons to be less confident when it comes 
to the connection between economic inclusiveness and economic growth. Simon 
Kuznets claimed that in the beginning of modern economic growth economic 
inequality increased to then later on decrease. The existence of his curve as a 
general phenom-enon is hotly debated. doubt. 
For industrialising Britain, its existence is not in According to Acemoglu and Robin-
son, extractive institutions will not be able to sustain growth in the long run. Claims 
about the long run always are problematic. For the Roman Empire it is generally ac-
cepted that its economic heydays were during  the  reigns of Trajan  A.D. 98-117 
and Hadrian  A.D. 117-138. According to Acemoglu and Robinson: “It was this 
transition from Republic to Principate and later naked empire that laid the seeds of 
the decline of Rome” (164. See also 168 and 179). That transition was in 27 B.C. 
The seeds took quite some time to grow. Did the Soviet Union really decline and fall 
47  For an overview of a huge amount of literature see Alberto Alesina with 
Eliana La Ferrara,‘Ethnic diversity and economic performance’, Journal of 
Economic Literature 43 (2005) 762-800.
48  See for the correlation between democracy and taking-off Ha-joon Chang, 
Kicking away the ladder. Development strategy in historical perspective 
(London 2002) 71-76.
49  See for some comments on the Kuznets-curve Branko Milanovic, The haves 
and the have- nots. A brief and idiosyncratic history of global inequality (New 
York 2011) under ‘Kuznets, Simon’ and ‘Kuznets, hypothesis’.
50  See  e.g. Jeffrey G. Williamson, Did British capitalism breed  inequality? 
(London  2006, originally 1985) 3, where he writes about: “… inequality 
rising sharply up to somewhere in the middle of the nineteenth century and 
falling modestly thereafter.”
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because of elites obstructing eco- nomic  innovation? China,  so the  authors claim, 
will in the  end get  in trouble. It is now some thirty-five years since Deng Xiaoping 
started his reforms. It still has  over  eight  per  cent annual growth (13-4-2012). 
Already in 1994, Paul Krugman predicted the end of the East Asian Mir- acle. In his 
view it primarily was a matter of increasing inputs, “perspira- tion,  not  inspiration”, 
and  would  therefore, ceteris paribus, just  peter out. But why would there be ceteris 
paribus? What about the possibility that this is the way  to accumulate the money 
needed to upgrade the economy? Might we not be dealing with a ‘necessary’ or at 
least ‘normal’ transitional phase in the process of catching up?
The role of the state
The state is the  institution of institutions. Economic development has become un-
thinkable without its serious involvement. Institutionalists like Acemoglu and Robin-
son cannot ignore it. They time and again repeat it has to be centralized and inclusive. 
But they never in any detail discuss its functions and activities apart from the fact 
that it has to be sovereign, provide law, order and public services, and encourage 
and regulate eco- nomic activity. (80-81) When they refer to governmental institutions 
and state policies it is always in terms like ‘facilitating’, ‘creating a level play- ing 
field’ and ‘shaping the right incentives’. That is a vague, incomplete and in several 
instances simply  incorrect, description of what govern- ments in rich countries 
are doing and have been doing. Average govern- ment spending in Austria, Bel-
gium,  Britain, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Spain, 
Sweden, Switzerland and the United States, all amongst the wealthiest countries 
in the world, from the 1980s onwards was never less  than forty-three per cent of 
GDP. Is that all spent on ‘facilitating’, ‘creating a level playing  field’ and ‘shaping the 
right incentives’? Again, it is always easy to point at omissions, but how can you write 
a 529 pages book on the role of institutions in economic development, point at the 
fundamental importance of the state, and then have no entry in your Index – to only 
give some examples in alphabetical order – for ‘developmental state’, ‘fiscal-mili-
tary state’, ‘mercantilism’, ‘MITI’, ‘New Deal’, ‘state capitalism’ or ‘welfare state’? All 
policies and ideas that are not in line with the institutionalist mainstream are simply 
ignored. Even Dani Rodrik, who grounds his work in neo-classical eco-nomic analysis, 
in a recent book came up with a much broader range of government tasks.
Conclusion
With authors like these one  can  only have the  highest expectations. Whatever the 
many  qualities of the book, it does not live up to those expectations. It is not “brilliant 
51  Paul Krugman, ‘The myth of Asia’s miracle’, Foreign Affairs 73 (1994) 62-78, 
page 66.
52  The Economist, Taming Leviathan. A special report on the future of the state 
March 19th 2011.
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in its simplicity and power” as Stevin Levitt puts it on the flap of the version I have. It 
has too many flaws to receive the highest praise. For that I would characterise it as 
too mono- causal, too repetitive, too categorical in its claims, too vague in its central 
concepts and its comparisons, too weak on international political econo- my, too 
focused on proving its thesis and too negligent when it comes to testing it. I fully 
understand that in a book like this it is inevitable to sim- plify and it would be unfair to 
come up with the classic knockdown argu- ment of the historian that in reality things 
are more complicated. As a historian I can only applaud that two distinguished so-
cial scientists point at the importance of history and integrate it into their analysis. 
I am very much in favour of books with a message and do not in principle object 
to efforts to give all-encompassing, almost mono-causal explanations. Far from, 
I consider it one of the main challenges of science to explain as much as possible 
by as little as possible. But in this text the authors too often cross the line between 
simplification as explanation and simplifica- tion as distortion.
Working Papers in Technology Governance and Economic Dynamics
The Other Canon Foundation, Norway, and the Technology Governance program 
at Tallinn University of Technology (TUT), Estonia, have launched a new  working 
papers series, entitled “Working Papers in Technology Governance and Economic 
Dynamics”. In the context denoted by the title series, it will publish  original research 
papers, both practical and theo- retical, both narrative and analytical, in the area 
53  For heterodox ideas and descriptions of what states actually should 
do and did to promote growth see e.g. Ha-joon Chang, Kicking away the 
ladder; Erik Reinert, How rich countries got rich… and why poor countries 
stay poor (New York 2007) and Linda Weiss and John A. Hob- son, States 
and economic development. A comparative historical analysis (Cambridge 
1995). More in particular for the developmental state see Chalmers 
Johnson, Japan. Who governs? The rise of the developmental state (New 
York and London  1995); Robert Wade, Governing the market. Economic 
theory and the role of government in East Asian industrialisation. With a new 
introduction by the author  (Princeton and Oxford 2004, originally 1990) and 
Meredith Woo- Cumings, ed., The developmental state (Ithaca and London 
1999). For the rise of ‘state capital- ism’ see e.g. Ian Bremmer, The end 
of the free market. Who wins the war between states and corporations? 
(New York 2010) and The Economist, Special Report. State capitalism. The 
visible hand, January 21st 2012. The literature about mercantilism and 
the welfare state fills an entire library. I can only advise the reader, for a first 
exploration, to look under the concepts on Ama- zon.com
54  Rodrik, One economics, many recipes, chapter five. He refers to property 
rights, regulatory institutions (that redress or prevent market failures), 
institutions for macroeconomic stabilisation (that implement Keynesian 
anti-cyclical policies), institutions for social insurance, and institu- tions for 
conflict management. For his reference to neo-classical economics see 
page 3.
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denoted by such con- cepts as uneven economic growth, techno-economic pa-
radigms, the his- tory and theory of economic policy, innovation strategies, and the 
public management of innovation, but also generally in the wider fields of indus- trial 
policy, development, technology, institutions, finance, public policy, and economic 
and financial history and theory.
The idea is to offer a venue for quickly presenting interesting papers – scholarly 
articles, especially as preprints, lectures, essays in a form that may be develo-
ped further later on – in a high-quality, nicely formatted version, free of charge: all 
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